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We review the evidence that an ability to achieve a precise balance between
representing the self and representing other people is crucial in social inter-
action. This ability is required for imitation, perspective-taking, theory of
mind and empathy; and disruption to this ability may contribute to the symp-
toms of clinical and sub-clinical conditions, including autism spectrumdisorder
and mirror-touch synaesthesia. Moving beyond correlational approaches, a
recent intervention study demonstrated that training participants to control
representations of the self and others improves their ability to control imitative
behaviour, and to take another’s visual perspective. However, it is unclear
whether these effects apply to otherareas of social interaction, such as the ability
to empathize with others. We report original data showing that participants
trained to increase self–other control in the motor domain demonstrated
increased empathic corticospinal responses (Experiment 1) and self-reported
empathy (Experiment 2), as well as an increased ability to control imitation.
These results suggest that the ability to control self and other representations
contributes to empathy as well as to other types of social interaction.1. Introduction
Successful social interaction involves manipulating neural representations of other
people across diverse domains including imitation, perspective-taking, theory
ofmind (ToM) and empathy [1]. In this article, we first review the evidence that suc-
cess within each of these areas requires the ability to control the extent to which
representations of the self or of the other are activated (‘self–other control’). We
then discuss how a breakdown in this ability contributes to the symptoms of both
clinical and sub-clinical conditions. In the third section, we present original data
demonstrating that training self–othercontrol inonedomainof social cognition, imi-
tation,has effects onperformance inanotherdomain, empathy, supporting the claim
that self–other control contributes to social interaction across social domains.
2. Self–other control within social cognitive domains
When interactingwith another person,wemust process constantly changing social
information including the actions, perspectives, beliefs and emotions of others.
There is now compelling evidence that processing these attributes in another
activates the same neural representations as when the self experiences these
events (‘mirroring’ [2–4]), because of associations between other- and self-relevant
representations [5,6]. Such ‘mirror’ processes result in potential conflict between
self- and other-relevant representations, and thus a requirement for ‘self–other
control’: the ability to manipulate the extent to which self- or other-relevant
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tion requires the ability to distinguish between one’s ownmotor
plan and that of the other, instantiated in the self through
psychological and neurological processes supporting imitation,
before the other-related motor programme is inhibited and that
relating to the self enhanced [7]. When taking another person’s
perspective, representation of one’s own perspective must be
inhibited in favour of representation of the other’s perspective
[8]. Similarly, in ToM tasks, one needs to represent the other’s
beliefs, rather than one’s own [9]. Finally, when empathizing
with another person, differential activation of self- or other-
related representations may lead to different outcomes: in
order to feel ‘with’ another, the affective state resulting fromrep-
resentation of the other’s emotions must be enhanced and the
representation of one’s own affective state inhibited; however,
in order to prevent excessive personal distress (PD) as a result
of another’s negative affective state, it may be more adaptive
to inhibit the representation of the other’s affective state [10].
Overall, it appears that a similar mechanism of self–other con-
trol contributes to successful performance within each of these
social cognitive domains.
The suggestion that self–other control involves a common
neural mechanism is supported by both neuroimaging and
neurostimulation data indicating that the right temporoparietal
junction (TPJ) supports a processwhich contributes to imitation
control, perspective-taking and ToM [11–15]. However, the
control of representations of the self and others in the domain
of empathy depends on a different area of parietal cortex
(supramarginal gyrus [16]). The finding that different areas of
parietal cortex may support self–other control for different
domains of social interaction (broadly, cognitive versus affective
domains) suggests two contrasting scenarios. The first is that
empathy may not involve the same self–other control process
as imitation control, perspective-taking and ToM. Alternati-
vely, these anatomically distinct areas of parietal cortex may
implement the same cognitive process on different inputs.
Under the first scenario, the ability to implement self–other con-
trol in one socio-cognitive domain should not be related to that
ability in other domains; whereas under the second scenario,
impairments in one domain might be expected to correlate
with impairments in others. Therefore, the next section con-
siders clinical and sub-clinical conditions in which self–other
controlmaybe impaired, and investigateswhether impairments
in one social domain correlate with those in others.3. Impairments in self–other control
(a) Autism spectrum disorder
Primary evidence for impaired self–other control in autism
spectrum disorder (ASD) is derived from the frequent diffi-
culties experienced by autistic individuals when attempting
to inhibit the tendency to imitate others. As discussed
above, the ability to inhibit imitation and instead execute a
task-appropriate action requires the control of other-related
motor programs. It has been long been recognized clinically
that individuals with ASD are less able to inhibit imitation
of the speech (echolalia) [17] and actions (echopraxia) [18]
of others, and recent experimental data confirm the reduced
ability to inhibit imitation in individuals with ASD [1,19].
Reduced ability to control representations of the self and
others may also contribute to the well-established impair-
ments in ToM exhibited by individuals with ASD [20], suchthat representation of one’s own mental state interferes with
accurate representation of that of another, particularly
during situations exemplified by False Belief tasks. Indeed,
the degree to which individuals with ASD were impaired at
imitation–inhibition has been shown to predict both per-
formance on a behavioural (verbal) test of ToM and
neurological activation within a previously identified ToM
network when participants completed a non-verbal ToM
task [1]. Direct evidence of atypical neurological activation
during a self- and other-processing task was provided by
Lombardo et al. [21,22], who demonstrated atypical response
in TPJ, the area of the brain thought to be responsible for
self–other control, when participants with ASD were asked
to selectively represent the self or another.
More speculative is the suggestion that the increased PD
in response to another’s pain in ASD ([23]; see [24] for an
overview) is a direct consequence of impaired self–other con-
trol. Several authors [25–27] have argued that responses to
the pain of another can be considered on a maturational gra-
dient determined by self–other control. Under these models,
PD is considered to be an immature response to another’s
pain in which representation of the other’s pain is unable to
be inhibited, to the extent that the observer feels a significant
degree of negative arousal. It is only later, when a sufficient
degree of self–other control has been achieved, that PD
reduces and empathic concern increases. This overview
suggests that difficulties in self–other control may contribute
to difficulties in the domains of imitation, ToM and empathic
responses to another’s pain in ASD.
(b) Mirror-touch synaesthesia
A further condition associating atypical socio-cognitive
development with impaired self–other control is mirror-touch
synaesthesia. Individuals with mirror-touch synaesthesia
experience tactile sensations on their own bodywhen observing
touch to other individuals [28–30], and (less frequently) when
observing touch to objects [29–31]. The experience has also
been linked with broader differences in social perception and
cognition, including heightened empathy [32,33] and emotion
perception [34].
A recent explanation of mirror-touch synaesthesia suggests
it results from difficulties in the ability to distinguish and
control representations of the self from others [35]. This leads
to the amplified vicarious tactile experiences symptomatic of
the condition as a result of failure to inhibit other-relevant
somatosensory representations. This explanation is supported
by evidence that mirror-touch synaesthetes show structural
brain differences which extend beyond brain regions involved
in somatosensory mirroring to those involved in self–other
control, including the right TPJ [36]. This account further
predicts that mirror-touch synaesthetes should show impair-
ments in other social cognitive domains where the control of
other-relevant representations is required. Thus, it is note-
worthy that mirror-touch synaesthetes show impairments
in the ability to control imitation (requiring inhibition of
other-relevant representations), but are not impaired at visual
perspective-taking or ToM (requiring inhibition of self-relevant
representations) [37], suggesting a specific impairment in self–
other control processes in mirror-touch synaesthesia that may
contribute to the documented atypical interpersonal repre-
sentations of touch and emotion processing in this condition.
This provides further evidence that self–other control may
contribute to performance in multiple social cognitive domains.
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cognitive domains
Sections 2 and 3 used task analysis along with patterns of
anatomical and clinical correlation to argue that the same
self–other control processes are involved across a variety of
social domains. However, although these approaches are sup-
portive of this conclusion, they do not demonstrate a causal
link between self–other control ability and performance
across social cognitive domains. An alternative approach to
establish the contribution of self–other control to social inter-
action is to train this ability in one domain and assess the
effect of training on other areas of social interaction. Santieste-
ban et al. [38] trained participants to increase self–other control
in the motor domain, by means of a task based on the work of
Brass et al. [39] requiring them to inhibit the tendency to imitate
another person (increasing self–other control) or to enforce this
tendency (decreasing self–other control). Training to increase
self–other control improved both the control of imitation and
visual perspective-taking. As noted above, however, both pro-
cesses are known to rely on right TPJ [13,14]. A more stringent
test of the involvement of self–other control across social
cognitive domains is to measure whether training to increase
self–other control in the motor domain affects a process that
does not depend on the same neuroanatomical location,
namely empathy. This study, therefore, testedwhether training
to increase self–other control influences empathy, using both
an implicit corticospinal empathy measure [40] (Experiment
1) and an explicit self-report measure (Experiment 2).
A single transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) pulse
applied to the primary motor cortex representation of a par-
ticular muscle produces a motor-evoked potential (MEP) in
that muscle, the amplitude of which reflects corticospi-
nal excitability. Observation of another person receiving a
painful stimulus results in reduced MEP amplitude com-
pared with observation of touch [40–43]. This corticospinal
empathy measure has been interpreted as automatic simu-
lation of another’s pain because the same inhibition occurs
during receipt of pain to the self [43], possibly reflecting a
withdrawal reflex [44].
If self–other control contributes to empathy in the same
way that it does to other areas of social interaction, then train-
ing should impact upon empathy, because participants trained
to increase self–other control should be better able to separate
their own, non-pain, state from the pain state of the other. This
improved separation shouldmean that participants exhibit less
of an egocentric biaswhen representing the other [16], and thus
simulate their pain to a greater extent, increasing corticospinal
inhibition during observation of pain in another person,
compared with during observation of touch.
Accordingly, participants were randomly allocated to one of
two training groups (increased and decreased self–other con-
trol). Twenty-four hours after training, corticospinal empathy
and theability to control imitationweremeasuredand compared
betweengroups (Experiment1). InExperiment2, training-related
changes in self-reported empathy were measured.
(a) Experiment 1
(i) Methods
Participants
Twenty-six right-handed participants aged 18–42 years (mean
22.8)were recruited from theUniversity of Surrey and screenedfor TMS contra-indications. To control for any effect of PD on
corticospinal empathy (corticospinal empathic responses
reverse in individuals with high levels of PD [41,45]) individ-
uals were pre-screened using the Davis Interpersonal
Reactivity Index (IRI) PD subscale [46]. Those with a PD
score of 13 or lower (within 1 s.d. of the population mean
[47]) were randomly assigned to either the decreased self–
other control or increased self–other control training group.
Participants attended on two consecutive days. One partici-
pant in the decreased self–other control group did not
complete Day 2, resulting in 13 participants (five male) in the
decreased self–other control group and 12 participants (five
male) in the increased self–other control group. Groups did
not differ in terms of age or IRI subscale scores (all ps. 0.3).
Procedure
OnDay 1, participants received either imitation training or imi-
tation–inhibition training to decrease or increase self–other
control, respectively [38]. OnDay 2, participants: (i) underwent
single pulse TMS to assess corticospinal empathic responses to
pain observation; (ii) completed an imitation control task, and
(iii) completed a control simple response time task. Following
testing, participants were debriefed. No participants reported
awareness of the link between the Day 1 training and the
Day 2 empathy test.
Day 1: training to decrease or increase self–other control
Participants in both groups performed a task based on
that developed by Brass et al. [39]. Short videos were presented
to participantswith either an index ormiddle finger performing
a liftingmovement (figure 1a).A resting left handwaspresented
for avariable duration (800–2400 ms) before the onset of an irre-
levant number (1 or 2) and a finger lifting movement, which
lasted 68 ms with a final frame of 500 ms in which the finger
remained in the lifted position. The stimulus hand was rotated
around the sagittal and transverse planes with respect to the
participant’s right hand, which rested on the keyboard. This
was to prevent any possible confounds because of spatial com-
patibility [48]. Participants were instructed to press their index
finger down on the ‘V’ key and the middle finger down on the
‘B’ key. Participants in the decreased self–other control group
were asked to lift their index finger when the index finger
of the stimulus hand lifted, and to lift their middle finger
when themiddle finger of the stimulus hand lifted. Participants
in the increased self–other control groupwere asked to lift their
middle fingerwhen the index finger of the stimulus hand lifted,
and to lift their index fingerwhen themiddle fingerof the stimu-
lus hand lifted. Participants were instructed to press back down
on the appropriate starting key before the following trial and to
ignore the numbers, 1 or 2, that appeared on the screen. A total
of 432 trials were presented randomly across six blocks, with a
fully factorial combination of stimulus movement (index or
middle finger lift) and irrelevant number (1 or 2) repeated 18
times per block for a total of 72 trials per block. Response
times were measured from the onset of the finger movement
and irrelevant number.
Day 2: (i) Corticospinal empathy
TMS andMEP recordings: single-pulse TMSwas administered
using a Magstim Rapid2 stimulator with a 70 mm figure-8 coil
positioned over left primary motor cortex, at the position from
which MEPs with maximal amplitude could be recorded from
both the first dorsal interosseus (FDI) target muscle and
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Figure 1. Stimuli for Experiment 1 (a) self–other control training; (b) imitation control task; (c) measurement of corticospinal empathy; (d ) response time task, and
Experiment 2 (e) imitation control task; ( f ) self–other control training. (a) During self–other control training, participants either performed the same, or a different,
movement to that observed according to their assigned training group, and ignored the number cues. Two of four possible trial types are shown here; two further
trial types were also presented (index finger video with irrelevant number 2; middle finger video with irrelevant number 1). (b) During the imitation control task, all
participants responded to the number cues while ignoring the finger movements. They were instructed to lift their index finger on presentation of a 1, and their
middle finger on presentation of a 2. Trials on which the irrelevant finger movement is congruent with the cued response produce no requirement for imitation
control; trials on which the irrelevant movement is incongruent with the cued response require the participant to control the tendency to imitate the irrelevant
finger movement. (c) Final frames of the pain and touch videos. (d ) Image pairs used in control response time task. (e) Stimuli used in imitation control task in
Experiment 2. ( f ) Stimuli used in self–other control training in Experiment 2. (Online version in colour.)
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threshold (rMT) was determined as the lowest stimulus
intensity that induced at least five MEPs (of at least 50 mV
peak-to-peak amplitude) out of 10 consecutive TMS pulses in
both muscles [49]. Mean rMT was 56.9% (range 44–74%) of
maximum stimulator intensity. During the recording session,
stimulation intensity was set to 120% of rMT. MEPs were
recorded simultaneously from FDI and ADM muscles of the
participant’s right hand. Electromyographic recordingwas per-
formed through pairs of Ag–AgCl surface electrodes placed
over the muscle belly (active electrode) and the associatedjoint or tendon (reference electrode). The ground was placed
over the participant’s right wrist. The signal was sampled
(5000 Hz), amplified, band-pass filtered (3 Hz–1000 Hz) with
a 50 Hz notch filter and stored for off-line analysis. Data were
collected from 100 ms before to 300 ms after the TMS pulse.
MEP analysis: trials with muscle activity greater than
50 mV in the 100 ms before the TMS pulse were discarded
(mean+ s.e.m. percentage of trials in FDI: 1.3+0.6%; ADM:
0.6+0.3%). For each muscle, peak-to-peak MEP amplitu-
des for each trial were normalized to the block median MEP
amplitude for that muscle. Extreme outlier trials (MEP
decrease self–other
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Figure 2. Experiment 1: results of training to increase or decrease self–other control on (a) corticospinal empathic inhibition and (b) control of involuntary imita-
tion. (c) Correlation between corticospinal empathic inhibition and control of involuntary imitation after training.
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were subsequently removed (FDI: 3.4+ 0.6%; ADM: 3.6+
0.6%) and the mean normalized MEP amplitude was calcu-
lated for each condition in each muscle. Corticospinal
empathy was calculated by subtracting mean normalized
MEP size during the touch control condition from that
during pain observation and dividing this value by that
obtained during the baseline static hand condition [42].
Stimuli and procedure: stimulus videos were modelled on
those used by Avenanti et al. [40]. The videos were 1800 ms in
length and were presented from a first-person perspective
showing a needle deeply penetrating (pain condition) or a
cotton-bud touching (touch control condition) the FDI in a
model’s right hand (figure 1c). A baseline video was also
included showing a static right hand. In the touch and pain
videos, the cotton-bud and needle made initial contact with
the skin by 700 ms, with full cotton-bud depression and
needle penetration by 1100 ms. All movement across all
video stimuli ceased at 1100 ms. Each trial comprised one
video followed by a 5-s blank screen. During each trial, a
single TMS pulse was administered at one of three timepoints
between 1100 ms and 1400 ms to prevent habituation. A total
of 144 trials were presented randomly across four blocks,
with a fully factorial combination of video type (pain, touch
or static) and pulse timepoint repeated four times per block
for a total of 36 trials per block. Participants were given a
2-min break between blocks.
Day 2: (ii) Imitation control task
After TMS, participants completed the imitation control task.
During this task, participants were presented with the same
finger movement videos used for the training on the previous
day ([39] and figure 1b for further details). A total of 120 trials
were presented randomly across two blocks, with a fully fac-
torial combination of irrelevant stimulus movement (index or
middle finger lift) and response (index or middle finger lift,
instructed by a number cue of ‘1’ or ‘2’, respectively) repeated
15 times per block for a total of 60 trials per block, comprising
30 congruent and 30 incongruent trials. Response times were
measured from the onset of the number cue and irrelevant
finger movement. Trials with response times less than
150 ms or greater than 2000 ms ([50]; 0.2+ 0.2% of trials)
were removed prior to analysis.
Day 2: (iii) Control reaction time task
Participants then completed a simple response time task
to assess whether self–other control training influenced proces-
sing speeds for the trained stimuli. Participants were presented
with three pairs of images: (i) red triangle followed by bluesquare (non-social control); (ii) cotton-bud away from hand fol-
lowed by cotton-bud pressing on FDI (touch) and (iii) needle
away from hand followed by needle penetrating FDI (pain)
(figure 1d) and were instructed to press the space bar as soon
as the first image changed to the second image. To prevent
habituation, four different time intervals (900, 1000, 1100 and
1200 ms) were used between the first and second images.
A fully factorial combination of time interval and image pair
type (non-social control, touch, pain) was repeated five times
to a total of 60 trials. Mean response times were measured
from the onset of the second image. Trials with response
times less than 150 ms or greater than 2000 ms (4.9+1.0% of
trials) were removed prior to analysis.(ii) Results
Corticospinal empathy
Corticospinal empathy was analysed using an independent-
samples t-test comparing the two groups (increased self–
other control and decreased self–other control). Normalized
MEP size in the FDI target muscle for observation of pain,
compared with observation of touch, was significantly lower
in the increased self–other control group (25.8+3.8%) as
compared to the decreased self–other control group (6.8+
3.7%, t23 ¼ 2.387, p ¼ 0.026, d ¼ 0.956; figure 2a). This suggests
that participants trained to increase self–other control demon-
strated increased corticospinal empathy, as demonstrated by
increased MEP inhibition when observing painful versus
tactile stimulation, compared with those trained to decrease
self–other control.Imitation control
The imitation control effect was calculated by subtracting
mean response time on congruent trials from that on trials
requiring imitation control; therefore, higher values reflect a
failure of self–other control. The increased self–other control
group had a lower imitation control effect (53+ 9 ms) than
the decreased self–other control group (95+11 ms, t23 ¼
3.030, p ¼ 0.006, d ¼ 1.219; figure 2b). This suggests that par-
ticipants trained to increase self–other control demonstrated
an increased ability to control involuntary imitation.
In order to establish whether training-related differences
in empathy were related to the ability to control imitation, a
correlation analysis was performed following removal of
one multivariate outlier. Empathy was significantly corre-
lated with the ability to control imitation (r24 ¼ 0.488, p ¼
0.016; figure 2c), such that participants with increased corti-
cospinal empathic inhibition were also better able to control
the tendency to imitate others.
rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org
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Electronic supplementary material, table S2 displays
mean response times for the three stimulus types for each
training group. A mixed ANOVA was conducted on the
response times with stimulus type (non-social control,
touch, pain) as within-subjects factor and group (decreased
self–other control, increased self–other control) as between-
subjects factor. There was no main effect of group (F1,23 ¼
2.167, p ¼ 0.155), no main effect of stimulus type (F2,46 ¼
2.425, p ¼ 0.100) and no group  stimulus type interaction
(F2,46 ¼ 0.063, p ¼ 0.939) which suggests that training did
not influence response times.l.Trans.R.Soc.B
371:20150079(iii) Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that training to control rep-
resentations of the self and others in one socio-cognitive
domain can transfer to another social domain. Participants
trained to increase self–other control in the motor domain
demonstrated increased corticospinal empathy, 24 h after train-
ing, compared with a group trained to decrease self–other
control. In line with a previous study [38], participants trained
to increase self–other control also demonstrated an increased
ability to control involuntary imitation, and there was a mod-
erate relationship between participants’ scores across these
two socio-cognitive domains.
It is possible that the altered corticospinal empathy follow-
ing training to increase self–other control can be interpreted as
an improved ability to withhold a motor response during pain
observation (e.g. [51]). However, given that the control reaction
time task did not demonstrate an effect of training on response
times to pain stimuli, that speeded motor responses were
required in both training conditions and that pain stimuli
were not used during training, it seems unlikely that the
effect of training is due to an improved ability to withhold a
motor response to these stimuli. It is also possible that the
use of MEPs to index corticospinal empathy increased the like-
lihood of finding an effect of self–other control training on
empathy, because the training was administered in the motor
domain and MEPs were measured in response to stimulation
of primary motor cortex. However, the use of a measure com-
bining touch, pain and staticMEPs rules out the possibility that
the effects of training are due solely to changes in corticospinal
excitability caused by training. In addition, effects on corti-
cospinal empathy were found 24 h after training, suggesting
that they are unlikely to be due to immediate changes in
corticospinal excitability as a result of the inhibitory demands
of self–other control training. In order to rule out this possi-
bility, however, Experiment 2 used a self-report measure of
empathy to assess the effects of training.
Finally, it is possible that the apparent effects of
self–other control training on corticospinal empathy in
Experiment 1 were not due to the training itself, but instead
were due to pre-existing differences between groups in corti-
cospinal empathy due to random sampling error (although
no pre-training differences were present in self-reported
empathy; see Experiment 1 Participants section). Therefore,
Experiment 2 measured the effects of training in terms of
change from a pre-training baseline. This also allows assess-
ment of whether the effects found in Experiment 1 result
from an increase in empathy in the increased self–other con-
trol training group, or alternatively from a decrease in
empathy in the other training group.(b) Experiment 2
In contrast with Experiment 1, which used an implicit measure
of empathy, Experiment 2 assessed whether self–other control
training could alter an explicit, self-report measure of empathy.
This enabled the assessment of whether the results found in
Experiment 1 were specific to the particular measure used.
Different training stimuli and actions were used to ensure
that the results of Experiment 1 were not specific to one type
of action. In addition, self-reported empathy was measured
both before and after training, enabling assessment of which
training type drives the effects of training.
(i) Methods
Participants
Forty-four right-handed participants (16 male) aged 18–35
years (mean 21.8) were recruited from the University of
Surrey, screened for normal or corrected to normal vision,
and randomly assigned to either the decreased self–other con-
trol or increased self–other control training group. Participants
attended on two consecutive days.
Procedure
Participants completed the Questionnaire of Cognitive and
Affective Empathy (QCAE; [52]) during the pre-screening
stage of the experiment to enable pre- and post-training com-
parison of self-reported empathy. This questionnaire
comprises 31 items (sample: ‘I am good at predicting how
someone will feel’) to which participants must respond with
one of four choices (strongly agree, slightly agree, slightly dis-
agree and strongly disagree), across five subscales, which index
both cognitive and affective empathy.
On Day 1, participants (i) completed an imitation control
task and (ii) received either imitation training or imitation–
inhibition training to decrease or increase self–other control,
respectively. On Day 2, participants: (i) completed the imita-
tion control task again and (ii) completed the QCAE again.
Testing was carried out by experimenters who were blind
to the hypothesized direction of training effects. Following
testing, participants were debriefed. No participants reported
awareness of the link between the Day 1 training and the
Day 2 empathy questionnaire.
Day 1: (i) Imitation control task
Participants completed a task based on Heyes et al. [53] but
using stimuli depicting a goal-directed button-pressing
movement of the index or middle finger of a left hand
(figure 1e; the electronic supplementary material).
Day 1: (ii) Training to decrease or increase self–other control
Training followed the same procedure as for Experiment 1,
with the following changes. The stimulus and response move-
ments were goal-directed button-press movements (figure 1f )
as used in the imitation control task of Experiment 2. Partici-
pants in the decreased self–other control group were asked
to press the ‘V’ key with their index finger when the index
finger of the stimulus hand performed a button-press, and to
press the ‘B’ key with their middle finger when the middle
finger of the stimulus hand performed a button-press. Partici-
pants in the increased self–other control group were asked to
press the ‘B’ key with their middle finger when the index
finger of the stimulus hand performed a button-press, and to
press the ‘V’ key with their index finger when the middle
rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org
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of 432 trials were presented randomly across six blocks, with
each stimulus movement (index or middle finger press)
repeated 36 times per block. Response times were measured
from the onset of the finger movement.
(ii) Results
A mixed ANOVA performed on the total QCAE scores
with between-subjects factor of group (increased self–other
control, decreased self–other control) and within-subjects
factor of session (pre-training, post-training) revealed an inter-
action between group and session, F1,42 ¼ 6.88, p ¼ 0.012,
h2p ¼ 0:141: Post hoc tests confirmed that therewas no difference
between the groups at pre-test (increased self–other control:
86.32+2.02; decreased self–other control: 88.77+1.83, t42 ¼
0.902, p ¼ 0.372) and that only the increased self–other control
group demonstrated a significant change between the two ses-
sions (increased self–other control, post-training: 89.86+1.87;
t21 ¼ 2.524, p ¼ 0.020, d ¼ 0.37; decreased self–other control,
post-training: 87.59+1.73; t21 ¼ 1.046, p ¼ 0.307), which
suggests that training to increase self–other control increased
self-reported empathy, and supports the suggestion that the
results of Experiment 1 were specifically due to the effect of
the increased self–other control training on empathy.
(iii) Discussion
Experiment 2 revealed that training to increase control of repre-
sentations of the self and others in the motor domain increases
an explicit, self-report, measure of empathy, compared with a
group trained to decrease self–other control. As with Exper-
iment 1, these effects were found 24 h after training. These
results are supportive of the results found in Experiment 1:
although the use of a different measure of empathy means
that the two experiments cannot be directly compared, these
results support the suggestion that the results of Experiment 1
were not an artefact of the measure used in that experiment,
nor were they due to pre-existing differences between the train-
ing groups. These results are also consistentwith the suggestion
that the effects of both experiments are due to increased empa-
thy in the group trained to increase self–other control, rather
than decreased empathy in the group trained to decrease
self–other control; however, this conclusionmust remain tenta-
tive because of the use of different training stimuli and actions,
and different measures of empathy across the two experiments.
(c) General discussion
The importance of self–other control for social interaction has
previously been demonstrated for imitation and perspective-
taking [38] but this is the first study to extend this finding
into the domain of empathy.
Experiment 1 demonstrated that participants trained
to increase self–other control showed increased empathic
corticospinal responses when observing painful versus tactile
stimulation applied to another person, compared with those
trained to decrease self–other control. They also demonstrated
an increased ability to control imitation, and amoderate relation-
ship was found between scores across these two socio-cognitive
domains.No effect of trainingwas foundon subjective ratings of
the pain and touch videos (see the electronic supplementary
material) or on response times to the stimuli, indicating that
these effectswere not due to increased attention to, orperceptual
processing of, the pain stimuli, or increased ability towithhold amotor response. Experiment 2 used different training stimuli
andmovements, and an explicit rather than an implicit measure
of empathy, but found consistent effects: participants trained to
increase self–other control showed increased self-reported
empathy, compared with those trained to decrease self–other
control. Thus, self–other control training modulated both an
objective, implicit measure and an explicit, self-report measure
of empathy for at least 24 h after training occurred.
During self–other control training, participants must
inhibit the motor representation activated by the sight of
another’s action and enforce their own motor representation.
We hypothesize that this leads to an increased ability to control
representations of the other and the self across multiple social
domains. The finding that self–other control training enhanced
corticospinal empathic responses to others’ pain supports the
contention that in order to empathize with others, it is necess-
ary to be able to control one’s own emotional state [16]. We
hypothesize that suppressing their own non-pain state allowed
participants better automatically to simulate the other’s pain.
Alternatively, increased self–other control may have improved
participants’ ability to identify the activated representation of a
pain state as ‘other’, reducing their PD and thus making them
more able to simulate the other’s pain [41]. These data are con-
sistent with the suggestion that increased levels of mirroring of
others’ tactile and pain sensations inmirror-touch synaesthesia
are the result of reduced self–other control.
One question resulting from these findings is whether the
effects of self–other control training are specific to this type
of training, or whether instead any type of executive function
training could produce similar effects on empathy. In their pre-
vious study, Santiesteban et al. [38] demonstrated that training
to increase self–other control, but not training in more general
cognitive inhibition, improved the ability to take another per-
son’s visual perspective. Thus, it appears likely that general
inhibition training would not have similar effects on empathy,
but this does remain a question for further research. More
broadly, it will be important for future research to clarify
whether self–other control is a specifically social process or a
sub-type of a more domain-general process [54,55].
The current findings can be comparedwith those of a recent
paper demonstrating that corticospinal excitability during the
observation of painful stimuli applied to another’s hand was
increased when that hand imitated the participant’s actions,
compared with when it did not [56]. The authors suggested
that being imitated by the hand gave the participant a sense
of control over the hand and that this increased corticospinal
excitability. The direction of our results is consistent with this
finding, but two significantmethodological differences suggest
a different interpretation. In this study, participants had no
sense of control over the hand during training because they
responded to the movements of the hand, rather than vice
versa; and the pain stimuli were applied to a hand that was
markedly different in orientation and background from the
hand to which they responded during training. Thus, our
data suggest that de Coster et al.’s [56] results may instead be
due to a general effect of being imitated on representations of
the self and the other. It is important to note that their ‘exerting
control’ condition consisted of participants whowere not exert-
ing self–other control as in our study, but instead were imitated
by the hand on the screen. We suggest that this is more similar
to our ‘decreased self–other control’ group: both of these
groups should show more self–other overlap following train-
ing, thus being less able to control the affective response to
rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org
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ability, compared with the increased self–other control group.
Sensorimotor training similar to that used in the present
experiments has also been used to demonstrate the effects of
experience on ‘mirror’ responses to others’ actions ([53,57]; see
[6] for a review). Sensorimotor experience can build new associ-
ations between sensory andmotor representations: for example,
typical social experience often produces ‘mirror’ associations—
that is, associations between sensory andmotor representations
corresponding to the same action. After such associations are
formed, however, training to increase self–other control has
two distinct effects on social cognition. It not only produces
new ‘counter-mirror’ associations, but also improves the ability
to control self- and other-relevant representations, by training
the participant to inhibit the automatic activation of other-
relevant representations (resulting from the presence of an
initial mirror association). We suggest, therefore, that training
to increase self–other control will only be effective where
other-relevant representations are already associated with
one’s own representations of those attributes.
The current data are among the first to demonstrate that a
short behavioural intervention in one socio-cognitive domain
can modify social cognitive functioning in another domain
(see also [38]), and the first to show such effects on empathy.
The finding that self–other control training not only modu-
lated corticospinal empathy and self-reported empathy but
also increased the ability to control imitation suggests that
the relationships between these different social cognitive
domains are mediated by self–other control processes. Our
data suggest, therefore, that although the control of imitation
and self–other control in the affective domain may produce
responses in adjacent brain areas [16], it is likely that these
areas (the TPJ and supramarginal gyrus) perform the samecomputations on different inputs (and with different outputs)
as a product of their distinct anatomical connectivity [58] (see
[59] for a comparable example of two adjacent brain areas
implementing the same computational process on different
inputs as a function of each area’s anatomical connectivity).
However, it will be important for future research to follow-
up the current results by testing whether the neural networks
underlying self–other control training can be specifically iso-
lated to TPJ or supramarginal gyrus, or whether in fact both
areas are affected by this type of training.
The current results suggest that the control of neural rep-
resentations of the self and other is an ability that is crucial
for many types of social interaction, and also pave the way
for the use of behavioural interventions to improve cognition
across multiple social domains.
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